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Refining the prize: Chinese oil refineries
and its energy security
Inwook Kim
Abstract Since China became a net oil importer in 1993, oil refineries have played
integral roles in China’s quest for oil security. And yet, the capacity, security, and
configurations of refineries were rarely featured in the discussions about China’s oil
policy. To fill this gap, this paper explains the basics of refinery economics and
technology, and details the development in China’s refining industry since the early
1990s. By taking refineries into consideration, it then revisits and reassesses the
existing literature regarding the motives and drivers behind China’s foreign oil
policy, its effectiveness, and the political interactions between China and crude oil
producers.
Keywords: China’s energy security; refineries; oil trade; Chinese foreign policy;
technology.
1. Introduction
China is a latecomer in the global race for oil. China became a net oil
importer in 1993, and its vigorous search for reliable oil sources would not
begin until the early 2000s. And yet, the phenomenal pace at which China
increased its oil imports quickly gripped the attention of academia and pol-
icy circles alike, and the study of the motives, effectiveness, and conse-
quences of China’s pursuit for oil security now constitutes one of the most
critical subjects of inquiry in both energy security and Chinese foreign pol-
icy literature.
Unfortunately, the discussion about China’s foreign oil policies has been
narrowly confined to its quest for ‘crude’ oil. It is only a part of oil security
strategies, however, as crude oil itself is of little military or industrial use
and needs to be further ‘refined’ into various petroleum products. Amount
and types of crude oil that domestic refineries can process, therefore, mat-
ter greatly in determining state’s resilience against unanticipated supply
shocks.
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To fill this gap, I first theorize how and why refineries matter. Crude oil is
not a homogenous commodity, but its quality varies across oil fields in terms
of sulfur content and density. Economics and technology of refineries are
such that refineries configured to process one type of crude oil are either tech-
nologically incapable or economically suboptimal to process other types of
crude oils. Due to this technological specificity, the state-level distribution of
refinery configurations can have meaningful effects on the importer’s ability
to withstand supply shocks and minimize the associated costs.
Second, I describe how Chinese refineries perceived and responded to
the challenges of expanding and upgrading its refining capacity and tech-
nology since it became a net oil importer in 1993. In 1993, they lacked
experiences and technology needed to remove sulfur from crude oil, a pro-
cess called desulfurization. The lack of desulfurization units meant that,
for the time being, China could only import crude oil with low sulfur con-
tent. This significantly limited range of importable crude oil for China,
which was a cause for concern due to the concomitant exponential growth
of domestic oil consumption. As the associated business risks and costs
became larger and clearer, aggressive plans to add sulfur-handling units
were devised, which are still being improved and implemented nationwide.
Third, by taking the Chinese refinery developments into account, I reas-
sess the conventional wisdom regarding drivers, effectiveness, and political
implications of China’s foreign oil policy. First, in addition to the widely
scrutinized Chinese state’s security concern and national oil companies’
profit motives, the presence or absence of desulfurization capacity was
another central but underappreciated determinant for the amounts and ori-
gins of Chinese oil imports. Second, the refinery analysis challenges the tra-
ditional understanding of supplier diversification. Chinese import portfolio
has been remarkably diversified until today, which led to a widespread
view that China has been correspondingly secure and resilient against sup-
ply shocks. However, my analysis shows that because China was running
on a tight refining capacity, it was much more vulnerable to supply shocks
than previously believed. On the other hand, with the ongoing transforma-
tion occurring in the refining structure, China’s ability to minimize costs in
times of crisis is likely to increase, again challenging the standard argument
that its growing reliance on the Middle East crude is making China more
vulnerable. Third, refinery capacity and configuration provide important
clues for whom China engages in foreign oil diplomacy. For instance,
China’s political and military ties with the Persian Gulf began to deepen,
only with the recent expansion in desulfurization capacity in the last
decade that allowed China to import Persian high-sulfur crude in larger
volumes. For outside observers, therefore, China’s refinery development
and cooperation warrant more careful and thorough monitoring to make
informed judgment about the trends in oil-based political linkages between
China and crude producers.
The next section introduces the basics of crude oils and refinery configura-
tions, and lays out why and how refineries affect oil security and international
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relations. The following section narrates the development of Chinese refiner-
ies since 1993, by dividing it into ‘status quo’, ‘awakening’, and
‘transformation’ periods according to the changes in refineries’ perception
and actual capacity. In the subsequent section, I revisit and critique the exist-
ing literature regarding the motives and drivers behind China’s oil policy, its
effectiveness, and the international political implications. In the last section, I
discuss the theoretical and future policy implications of this research.
2. Basics of refinery technology and economics
Refineries convert crude oil into a wide range of intermediates and finished
products through various processes such as separation, conversion, and
chemical treatment (Mehl 2012: 75). Despite its central place in oil flow
and security, the basics, roles, and consequence of refineries are never stud-
ied systematically in the literature (Levi 2010). This section aims to fill this
gap by outlining why and how refineries matter.
2.1 Varieties of crudes
Crude oil is not a homogenous commodity, as its quality remarkably differs
across oil fields. While various impurities and physical properties of crude
oil determine the overall quality of crudes, two characteristics are conven-
tionally used to classify crude types (Energy Information Agency [EIA]
2012). One is sulfur content. Typically, the crude with 0.5% of sulfur or
higher is called ‘sour’, and ‘sweet’ for 0.5% or lower. Density is another
important criterion, universally represented by American Petroleum Index
(API). It is conventionally divided into ‘heavy’ that denotes viscous crudes
and ‘light’ that are more fluid.1 A remarkable variation exists across crudes
around the globe, as the variation across regions and some of the major
fields are demonstrated in the Figures 1 and 2, respectively.
2.2. Refinery configurations
Sulfur content and density of major input crude are critical factors to consider
when refineries are designed and constructed. Simple descriptions of neces-
sary unit technological requirements are as follows. For light and sweet
crudes, crude distillation facility with basic reforming and treating units often
suffices. Refinery configuration becomes more complex, however, to process
crudes with higher sulfur content (sour) or lower API (heavy).
On the one hand, for heavy crudes, ‘cracking’ units are attached in order
to break down heavy crudes into more profitable smaller molecules, as
light crudes yield higher portion of value-added products (Mehl 2012:
162).2 On the other hand, for sour crudes, units to reduce or remove sulfur
are additionally required, a task usually performed by hydro-processing
technique (Horsnell 1997: 53) 3 The so-called desulfurization usually serves
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Figure 1 Distribution of crude grades across regions (IEA 2012).
Figure 2 Distribution of crude grades across some major oil fields (EIA 2012).
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two purposes: to meet the legal requirement designed to control sulfur
emission, and for maintenance purposes as sulfur is corrosive in pipes. In
general, refineries with desulfurization units are considered more advanced
and complex than the one with catalytic units only (Mehl, 2012: 98100).
Overall, heavier and sourer crudes require additional units, making them
more difficult and costlier to refine than sweeter and lighter counterparts.
Market reflects these different qualities of oil through price differentials,
as heavy and sour crude sells at a discount rate to lighter and sweeter
grades (Bacon and Tordo 2005: 5).
2.3. Why refineries matter
Refineries matter due to a combination of two attributes that their techno-
logical specificity is fixed in the short term and medium-term, and because
of it, refineries can process only a limited range of input crude type.
First of all, refineries are prohibitively expensive and significantly time-
consuming to build and maintain; a large modern refinery processing about
200,000500,000 b/d (barrels/day) would cost about $20,000/b (per barrel),
making the total cost of construction ranging 410 billion dollars (Mehl
2012). Expansion or upgrading refineries with secondary conversion units
such as desulfurization or cracking units also requires significant financial
capital4 as well as cutting-edge advanced technology, neither of which is
readily available to most firms (Wauquier et al. 1995: 53). Building refiner-
ies is a time-consuming task, too, as it is estimated to require 57 years for
planning, designing, permitting, and building a new medium-sized refinery
(Canadian Fuels Association 2013). On the other hand, profit margins
from refining are generally very low sometimes even nearing zero
(Andrews et al. 2010; Kosnett 2014).
Under this economics of high sunken cost and low profit margin, refinery
configurations tend to be highly ‘static’. It means that firms are generally
averse to refinery modification, expansion, or construction unless expected
profits are greater than large business risks associated with the investment
and time they require (Andrews et al. 2010). One important corollary of
technological configuration rigidity is that in the short and medium terms,
these refineries are either technically incapable or economically unwilling
to handle other crude types. First of all, refineries designed to process
sweet and light crudes are not equipped with the aforementioned desulfuri-
zation and cracking capacity, thereby making them simply incapable of
handling sour and heavy oils. One oft-used example in this regard is the
exceptionally heavy and sour Venezuelan crudes, for which none but a few
refineries in the Gulf Coast own the necessary technological capacity (EIA
2014).
Conversely, refineries designed to process sour and heavy crudes prefer
not to import sweet and light crudes, despite their technical ability to
I. Kim: Refining the Prize 365
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process them. The reason is in the economics of refineries, as processing
sour and heavy crudes yields larger profits due to the discount applied to
sour and heavy crudes (Phillips 2013). The suboptimality in processing
sweet and light crudes is especially severe when higher discount is applied
to heavy and sour grades in the market.
In sum, by limiting the availability of input crude, refineries affect the
flow of oil in international market. Movement of oil trade is determined by
the compatibility between the exported crude type and technological speci-
fication of target refineries.
2.4. How refineries matter
First, total refinery capacity matters  a state without sufficient refinery
capacity to meet its domestic consumption must purchase petroleum prod-
ucts at premium price. There are also military risks associated with insuffi-
cient refining capacity, since crude oil itself cannot provide military
mobility. For instance, a recent study pointed out that the likely outcome
of a major conventional conflict in the Taiwan Strait critically hinges on
whether refinery capacity of China and Taiwan would be sufficient to sat-
isfy the demands for militarily valuable petroleum products, jet fuel in par-
ticular (Kelanic 2013). Not all states operate refining capacity greater than
its consumption. It includes Iran, which is simultaneously the seventh larg-
est crude exporter and a significant gasoline importer (Harold and Nader
2012). Not only is the Iranian trade balance adversely affected by having to
import the petroleum products, but also it means that the crude-abundant
Iran would struggle securing petroleum products should it fight interna-
tionally isolated.
Second, distribution of domestic refining configurations place technolog-
ical constraints on the amount and origins of oil imports at a state level.
For instance, states where the majority of domestic refineries are config-
ured to process sweet and light crudes can only import from the regions
such as Africa that export the compatible grades. Similarly, states that are
dominated by advanced refineries to process sour and heavy crudes would
prefer to import from the Middle East or Central Asia where a large por-
tion of crude found have such quality.
For large developing states such as China or India, aggregated capac-
ity and distribution of refinery are a particular cause of state-level con-
cern, since the rising volume of oil imports forces the states to
continually face the challenge of building additional refineries and secur-
ing compatible crude grade. In contrast, the import portfolio for other
states for this concern tends to be less acute either because they import
fairly small amount of crudes or their crude oil consumption has stabi-
lized over the years.
Third, distribution of refinery configuration at state level significantly
affects the level of energy security, or state’s resilience against supply
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shocks. When a state’s entire domestic refineries are configured to process
one type of crudes, for instance, the state as a whole would have to struggle
to secure the desired grades in times of supply crisis, exposing them to
greater level of economic risks and costs. Conversely, if domestic refineries
are sufficiently diversified in terms of their technological configuration, the
stress imposed on availability of crudes would be less acute with some
spare refining capacity that refineries often retain. In supply crisis, these
capacities give the state greater range of importable crude oil that can sub-
stitute the lost barrels.
In some ways, refinery diversification is potentially more relevant and
consequential to energy security than supplier diversification which has
been historically viewed as viable and effective strategy to reduce a state’s
vulnerability to unanticipated oil supply disruptions (APERC 2000; Yergin
1990; Vivoda 2009). In fact, scholars have recently pointed out that the
merits of supplier diversification are declining as oil is now traded at a glob-
ally integrated market such that oil can be purchased at the market price
irrespective of its origins (Gholz and Press 2010). In contrast, due to the
refineries’ short-term and medium-term rigidity on the input crude type,
the diversification of refinery configurations strongly affects the state’s
ability to withstand supply shocks.
Fourth, refineries are founding bases that promote or prevent the devel-
opment of political ties with crude producers. As exemplified in the most
illustrative Saudi Arabia and the US relationship, oil trade has historically
facilitated political and even military ties between exporters and importers.
While fair consensus exists that the amount of oil traded is an important
factor in translating the trade into political linkages, virtually no analysis
acknowledges the critical intervening role that refinery plays. This is an
unsound omission. Oil trade can take place only as far as how much oil is
available from exporters, and how much refinery capacity an importer has
for the oil’s specific grade.
Depending on the broader strategic context and political orientation of
trade participants, refinery development and cooperation can quickly pro-
duce spillovers onto interstate political relations. In such a case, refinery’s
capacity or willingness to refine a specific exporter’s crude should not be
interpreted as a political business decision, but as political as to the extent
that trade volume is likely to be conducive to the promotion of political
ties.
3. Chinese refineries and the origins of oil imports since 1993
By the turn of the century, China’s trajectory to become one of the largest
oil importers was palpably clear (Jaffe and Lewis 2002), and heated discus-
sions about the implications of China’s quest for oil quickly cumulated into
a large body of literature within and outside the academia. And yet, the
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roles and consequences of Chinese refineries were conspicuously absent in
these discussions despite their central role in the flow of oil.5
This section first briefly describes the path dependency created by a
long-held dominance of domestic sweet on the Chinese refinery configura-
tions in 1993. Then, it analyzes the Chinese refinery development since
1993 in terms of the stages of sour-processing development. Accordingly,
the history of Chinese refineries since 1993 is divided into three stages 
status quo (1993late 1990s), awakening (late 1990searly 2000s), and
transformation (early 2000spresent). One immediate consequence of this
expansion was the changing origins of oil imports in China. Disproportion-
ate portion of Chinese oil imports consisted of sweet crudes until early
2000s, but it became gradually more balanced as China rapidly built sour
crude processing capacity in the 2000s.
3.1. Chinese refinery industry in 1993
3.1.1. Homogenous Chinese crudes
China has always been a major oil producer since its breakthrough discov-
ery of the Daqing field in 1963. One important characteristic about Chinese
crudes is that, as Table 1 illustrates, they are remarkably homogenous in
terms of density and sulfur content. On density, more than 90% of Chinese
crudes had an API level less than 35, making it medium or heavy. Simi-
larly, Chinese crudes are generally sweet (sulfur content less than 0.5%),
consisting about four-fifth of its entire oil production. The homogeneity is
partly driven by sweet and mediumheavy Daqing grade that made up
approximately 40% of Chinese domestic crudes (Purvin and Gertz Inc.
2008).
Table 1 Distribution of Chinese domestic crude (Author’s calculation)
Year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2012
Properties Total output
(thousand b/d)
2,986 3,253 3,628 4,096 4,137
Density Light crudes 126 231 262 66 73
Medium/heavy crudes 2,860 3,022 3,366 4,030 4,064
Proportion of M/H
crudes
95.8% 92.9% 92.8% 98.3% 98.2%
Sulfur content Sweet crudes 2,337 2,662 3,013 3,461 3,502
Sour crudes 649 591 615 635 635
Proportion of sweet
crudes
78.3% 81.8% 83.0% 84.5% 84.7%
Source: ENI 2013.
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3.1.2. Technological configuration for Chinese refineries in 1993
The crude surplus between 1963 and 1993 meant that virtually all
Chinese refineries had been built, maintained, and expanded in accor-
dance with the heavy and sweet slates of domestic crude over the three
decades (Walls 2010; Wu 2011). The resulting homogeneity in refinery
configurations left an important legacy on their compatibility with
varieties of crudes. On the one hand, Chinese refineries were equipped
with extensive sets of cracking units to process heavy crudes (Wu
2011) so that density simply posed little technical problems for Chinese
refineries.6
The legacy worked exactly the opposite for sulfur content. Due to the
sweetness of domestic crude,7 Chinese refineries had little experiences
and technology necessary to deal with the sulfur content. It is worth
noting that the Shengli field, the second largest in China, produces sour
crudes. However, its 0.9% sulfur content (Horsnell 1997: 409) is still rel-
atively low, which make it easily ‘sweetened’ by blending with other
sweet crudes (Collins 2008). Overall, Chinese desulfurization capacity
was unnecessary and hence virtually non-existent in 1993 (Horsnell
1997; Wu 2011).
3.2. 1993late 1990s: ‘status quo’
3.2.1. Perception and changes in the refinery industry
In this period, there are two grounds to suspect that Chinese refineries
lacked both political support and business rationale to consider building
costly sour crude processing units. First, the Chinese top leadership was
alleged to regard the oil imports as ‘temporary phenomenon’ and that the
best solution was to increase domestic exploration and production capacity
(Downs 2006: 39). This was also the time when the Chinese leadership had
a tighter grip on the decision-making of its surrogate National Oil Compa-
nies (NOCs).8 Under such political context, Chinese refineries probably
had little political directives to consider the upgrading existing units or
building new ones to process sour crudes. Instead, the main agenda at this
time was on the NOCs reform, with a particular emphasis on the integra-
tion of upstream and downstream sectors between Sinopec and China
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) (Kong 2010).
Second, Chinese oil imports in the 1990s were rising but still remained
low in absolute terms. For instance, Chinese oil import stood at meager
0.15 mb/d in 1993. In the same year, Japan and Korea imported 5.4 mb/d
and 1.68 mb/d, respectively. Chinese refineries could easily fill the oil defi-
cit by importing oils from a small number of sweet crude producers, mak-
ing sour crude processing units practically unnecessary. Overall, the
Chinese refinery configuration remained status quo for the better part of
the 1990s (The Gracia Group 2002).
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3.2.2. Origins of oil imports: dominance of sweet crudes
The status quo in Chinese refinery configuration had a straightforward effect
on the origins of imports  almost entirety of oil imports consisted of sweet
crudes. Although an exact proportion of sweet crudes is unknown, its domi-
nance is unmistakable. Table 2 shows that sweet crude producers such as
Indonesia, Oman, and Yemen remained top suppliers of crude to China
throughout the 1990s. Note that Omani and Yemeni crudes contain lower
level of sulfur compared to typical Gulf crudes. Sour crude producers from
the Gulf such as Iran and Saudi Arabia began to feature from the mid-1990s,
and they still constituted a minor proportion of Chinese total crude imports.
This is also a conservative estimate as China imported selective sweet brands
of Saudi and Iranian crudes rather than sour ones that made up the majority
of their exports (Wu 2011; Zha 2006; Downs 2006). Furthermore, other
sweet crude producers such as Libya, Norway, Malaysia, or Vietnam
frequently appeared in the top 10 crude suppliers to China in the 1990s.
3.3. Late 1990smid-2000s: ‘awakening’
3.3.1. Perception and changes
Two changes in market conditions in the late 1990s compelled the shift in
perception and decisions of NOCs in favor of installing desulphurization
units. First, it was now evident that the oil imports would continually rise,
perhaps at an accelerating pace (Jaffe and Lewis 2002), due to its maturing
domestic oil fields and the booming consumption. China began to realize
that it could no longer expect to continue filling its widening oil deficits
with sweet crudes only (Koyama 2002; Guo 2005).
Second, the difficulty in securing sufficient sweet crudes was exacerbated
by the concomitant decline in the export capacity of China’s traditional
sweet crude suppliers in Southeast Asia. The reason primarily lay in the
booming economies in the region, which in turn, took up an increasing pro-
portion of their stagnating domestically produced oils. The fall in Indone-
sian export capacity was especially staggering. Indonesia was the largest oil
supplier to China until 1996, whose crude export to China peaked in 1997
with 132,300 b/d. The figure, however, would shrink by almost 20-fold to
7,000 b/d by 2004 (Chinese Statistical Yearbook). Yemen and Oman were
two other traditional sources for sweet crudes. Yet, these were relatively
minor producers in the first place with Oman producing 891,000 b/d and
Yemen meager 228,000 b/d, and extremely low on reserves (The Gracia
Group 2002), while additional sweet crudes from the two were well below
China’s new demands.
3.3.2. Adding desulfurization capacity
By early 2000s, there was no way that either accelerating domestic demand
or contraction in sweet crude availability could be mistaken as temporary
by a market or the Chinese NOCs. Chinese refineries now had little choice,
370 The Pacific Review
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but to add desulfurization units in order to prepare itself for the inevitably
rising reliance on sour crudes in the coming years.
Indeed, Chinese refineries began to install and upgrade sulfur-processing
units. Sinopec, the largest Chinese refiner, processed a mere 0.12 mb/d of
sour crude in 1999 constituting only 6.8% of its total crude throughput, but
the ratio would jump to 24.8% having processed 0.70 mb/d in 2005 (Sino-
pec 1999, 2005). Although CNPC, the second largest refiner, does not pub-
lish the ratio of sour crude processed, similar trends have been reported.
These changes led to an overall increase in the total sulfur-processing
capacity, which according to one estimate, increased from 0.56 mb/d in
2000 to 0.86 mb/d in 2003 (Collins 2008), or 1.1 mb/d in 2004 (Demongeot
and Hua 2004).
However, China still lacked necessary technological and financial capital
to build, expand, or upgrade desulfurization units at a large scale. Instead, it
was a period of modest expansion, but accompanied by growing apprecia-
tion about the importance of acquiring sour crudes processing capability and
formulation of plans for corresponding upgrades and expansion of refineries.
3.3.3. Origins of oil imports: rise of African sweet crudes
Supported by the gradual and modest installation of desulfurization units, a
growing amount of sour oil began to flow into the Chinese downstream
market (Bradsher 2004) from countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait,
and the UAE.
However, a majority of Chinese refineries still remained largely config-
ured for sweet crudes, compelling NOCs to look for alternative sources of
sweet grades in the context of declining imports from Southeast Asia and
static imports from Oman and Yemen. In the late 1990s, two regions were
emerging as a new bonanza for oils  the Former Soviet Union (FSU)
states and Western Africa. The FSU oils were attractive as it allowed China
to mitigate the Malacca Dilemma (Lanteigne 2008), but it was financially
less appealing because of political and financial challenges in building pipe-
lines and, again, its high sulfur content. Western Africa was different. The
crudes would be transported by sea-lane whose costs do not vary greatly by
distance, and above all, oil there contains low levels of sulfur. The compati-
bility of African sweet crudes is frequently cited as a driver for the upsurge
of crude imports from the region (Downs 2006; Zha 2006). Angola has been
one of the largest crude suppliers to China since the late 1990s, and others
such as Sudan and Congo were important oil trade partners throughout.
3.4. Mid-2000searly 2010s: ‘transformation’
3.4.1. Perceptions and changes
A new development in the global oil market generated added financial
incentives to process sour crudes  a widening price differential between
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sweet and sour crudes (Collins 2008). Sour crudes sell at a discount rate
due to the additional conversion units they require. And economically, the
wider the price differential is, the more incentives there are to process sour
crudes. Furthermore, if the wide differential is anticipated to persist for
some time, incentives to invest in adding desulfurization units are likely to
strengthen.
Chinese NOCs began to form such expectation from the early 2000s, in
addition to the continually rising demand for oil imports (Tian 2005). Sino-
pec noted in 2005 that the company engaged in a series of cost-reduction
measures in the light of widening price spread between sweet and sour
crudes (Sinopec 2005). One such measure was to raise sour crude process-
ing volume, so as to lower procurement costs. Beginning in 2006, CNPC
who traditionally lagged behind Sinopec in sour crude processing similarly
took note of needs to tackle ‘problems associated with . . . sour crude proc-
essing’ for the first time in their annual reviews, indicating a change from a
lack of approving manner with which sour crude processing was received
in the company before (CNPC 2006).
3.4.2. Transformation of refinery configurations
Since the mid-2000s, China became a ‘powerhouse of refinery capacity
expansion” (IEA 2006: 54), most of which focused on the capacity for
heavy and sour crudes (Collins 2008) specifically targeting the anticipated
increase in the Middle East crude imports (Petroleum Intelligence Weekly
2005; Zhu 2008).
Some of the notable refineries completed include Dalian, which by
expanding its sour crude processing capacity to 20.5 Mt/a (roughly 410,000
mb/d) in 2008 became the largest refinery then (Nakamura 2008), Dushanzi
in 2009 that is designed to process sour crude oil from Kazakhstan, or the
Qinzhou upgrade in 2010 to handle a mix of Saudi light, medium, and
heavy crudes (ChemNet 2012). Cooperation with International Oil Com-
panies (IOCs) and other NOCs intensified, too. Saudi Arabia, in particular,
emerged as a major investor. In 2006, Saudi Arabia, in cooperation with
other Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) mem-
bers, was reported to have intent to build a new refinery in Guangzhou
with $8 billion (Asia Times 2006). The $3.5 billion upgrade to process
Saudi crudes in Fujian refinery was agreed to be shared between Sinopec,
Aramco, and ExxonMobil, while in May 2008, Qingdao refinery received
its first Saudi crudes with a sour crude processing capacity of 200,000 b/d
(Kemp 2010).
The overall sour crude processing capacity began to increase substan-
tially. In 2006, the ratio of China’s refining capacity that could handle sour
crude oil of the kind that came from Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other core
suppliers increased to 15% of China’s total refining demand (Collins 2008).
As desulfurization capacity expansion maintained the momentum in the
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late 2000s, aggregate sulfur processing capacity reached 3.3 mb/d (Wu
2011) in 2010, accounting for roughly 60% of Chinese total crude imports.
Desulfurization efforts are likely to continue (IEA 2012) in the coming
years. A pundit noted that ‘China’s refining structure is currently among
the most complex in Asia, focused on medium-sour crude’ (Wood
Mackenzie 2013), an assessment that would have made no sense at all
barely a decade ago. The Chinese refinery system was truly being trans-
formed at its typically rapid pace.
3.4.3. Origins of oil imports  half sweet and half sour
By 2010, China’s oil import portfolio became remarkably diversified in
terms of sulfur contents, thanks to the ongoing large-scale addition of
desulfurization capacity. The amount of sour imports correspondingly
increased in China. Saudi Arabia and Iran, the two largest sour exporters
since the early 2000s, continued to expand their share in China’s oil market
throughout the 2000s. In addition, other sour producers in the Middle East
such as Kuwait or UAE, who exported very little in the early 2000s, began
to export sizeable volume of sour crudes. The exponential growth of heavy
and sour Venezuelan oil imports is particularly staggering, increasing
nearly 300-fold from 1,000 to 301,200 b/d. By 2012, a majority of top oil
exporters to China were sour crude producers including Saudi Arabia,
Russia, Iran, Iraq, Venezuela, and Kazakhstan (United Nations Comtrade
Database) .
However, the simultaneous increase in Chinese oil demand did not mean
abrupt shrinking of China’s reliance on sweet crudes. Angola remained the
second largest supplier following Saudi Arabia, while Oman consistently
ranked as one of the top five crude suppliers. Moreover, China still relies
for roughly 40% of its oil consumption on domestic sweet crudes.
4. China and oil revisited
Putting refineries upfront as a determinant for oil trade entails several dis-
tinct political and strategic implications that the existing literature thus far
failed to take a note of. This section spells them out, focusing on the driver
of China’s oil trade, effectiveness of its foreign oil policy, and strategic ram-
ifications stemming from desulfurization capacity expansion.
4.1. Explaining the origins of oil
The refinery analysis provides technical reasons to doubt two existing
explanations  mercantilist and market-based  about the driver of
China’s oil trade. Mercantilist contends that the Chinese state actively
intervened in oil trade to ensure the amount and origins of oil imports
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adequately reflected China’s immediate and long-term energy security
goals (Jaffe and Lewis 2002; Zweig and Bi 2005; Taylor 2006; Lee 2005;
Leverett and Bader 2005; Dadwal 2007). According to this ‘statist’ argu-
ment (Vivoda and Manicom 2011), the Chinese government enjoyed politi-
cal and financial leverage over the NOCs, and therefore it was able to
pursue a more or less coherent and effective oil import policy. Market-
based approach rejects this view, maintaining that it is NOCs who are the
real decision-makers regarding foreign oil policy including acquisition bids
and oil trade (Chen 2008, Downs 2006; Liou 2009). They point out that the
Chinese state, in fact, suffers from split energy governance (Chen 2008;
Zha 2006) and a lack of oversight capacity (Cunningham 2007), conferring
growing operational autonomy (Kong 2010; Lieberthal and Herberg 2006;
Jiang and Sinton, 2011) to the NOCs. Under this view, the amount and ori-
gins of oil imports is determined by profitability of particular oil trade
route.
Refinery, however, challenges this debate as a whole by questioning the
relevance of the actors’ motive in the first place. The refinery analysis
above shows that technological barrier was a primary intervening variable
without which the amount and origins of oil imports in the past two deca-
des cannot be properly analyzed. More specifically, the lack of desulfuriza-
tion capacity limited the sources of importable oils, arguably to an extent
that neither state’s concern for energy security nor NOCs’ profit motive
would have made meaningful differences in the origins of oil imports.
Until the early 2000s, for instance, Africa was the only credible and size-
able sweet crude provider available who was compatible with China’s
domestic refinery configurations. Regardless of who was in charge of oil
trade, African crude would have made up a large proportion of China’s oil
imports. Similarly, China’s continuing oil demand growth since the mid-
2000s meant that the Middle East crude was the only viable crude source,
and any deficit of sour crude processing capacity had to be made up with
importing petroleum products. Again, the growing presence of the Middle
East was inevitable regardless of who was commanding the oil trade.
Second, it raises a related but under-addressed question of who makes
decisions about domestic refinery industry. If the refinery expansion was
engineered by the Chinese government, it can be said that the changing
pattern of oil trade reflected the state’s long-term energy goals. If commer-
cial logic of NOCs dictated the development of desulfurization capacity,
then the oil trade was merely reflecting the market’s supply and demand.
Whether the refinery expansion was a strategic or profit-driven choice
deserves a separate analysis and is beyond the scope of this paper. Some
preliminary observation can be made, however, which shows mixed empiri-
cal evidence. On the one hand, the Chinese government played active and
significant role in raising the sulfur-handling capacity. Most crucially, it was
deeply involved in promoting joint refinery ventures with sour crude pro-
ducers through summits, exchange of political favors, or provision of foreign
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aid. These projects led to some of the largest refinery constructions in China,
including the aforementioned refineries in Fujian or Qingdao. Recently, a
deal was agreed to build a refinery in Yunnan, capable of processing
200,000 b/d, which is specifically configured for Arabian sour crudes which
Saudi Arabia would provide under a long-term contract (DiPaola 2011).
On the other hand, there are commercial bases that could have moti-
vated NOCs to expand refinery capacity. From the business point of view,
selling refined products is preferable to importing petroleum products in
their domestic business operation for the profit margin is greater in the for-
mer. More importantly, the price of petroleum products such as gasoline is
regulated in China so that the NOCs are often compelled to sell the prod-
ucts at a rate lower than the market value. Operating their own refineries
is more cost-effective for the NOCs. Their profit motive also can be real-
ized by exporting the refined products abroad. China now boasts some of
the largest refineries and enjoys surplus of refinery capacity. It is now
known that the Chinese refinery expansion these days partly aims at nearby
export markets.
Overall, any analysis that fails to properly incorporate the intervening
roles of refineries is superficial, incomplete, and potentially misleading
guide toward understanding amount and origins of Chinese oil imports.
Such analysis really misses a key question of whether either state or NOCs
had any leeway in selecting the source of oil import in the first place.
4.2. China’s oil security revisited
China has been both highly anxious and visibly committed to promote its
energy security, and the effectiveness of these China’s foreign oil policies
has been another important subject of inquiries. Has China’s quest for oil
security been indeed successful, or have the policies failed to mitigate
China’s vulnerability to energy crisis? The refinery analysis again paints a
very different picture on the past, present, and future of China’s energy
security. For the past decade, a majority of analysts conclude that China
has been fairly successful (Downs 2006). The consensus is especially strong
when it comes to the supplier diversification which is believed to serve mul-
tiple purposes of reducing economic costs and risks, avoiding overreliance
on the politically US-friendly Middle East crude, and mitigating the
Malacca Dilemma (Chen 2011; Vivoda and Manicom 2011).
Data also appear to support the assessment. For example, Figure 3 traces
the Herfindahl index of oil imports for the major oil importers in Northeast
Asia, whereby the lower index represents more supplier diversification.
Also, it shows an unmistakable divergence between China that shows sus-
tained supplier diversification since the late 1990s, and Japan and Korea
who have not reduced the overreliance on the Middle Eastern crudes.
Figure 4 shows the origins of oil imports in China and Japan in 2011. Not
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only does China import oil from more suppliers, but these suppliers are
regionally much more diverse than those for Japan where five Persian Gulf
states supply over 80% of oil imports.
4.2.1. China’s energy security revisited
In terms of aggregate refining capacity, China did mostly retain surplus
refining capacity since 1993 (British Petroleum 2014), avoiding military
risks from having to import petroleum products. Also, China regulates the
price of refined products like gasoline, and surplus refinery capacity helped
lower the costs borne by NOCs that sell their petroleum at discounted rate.
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Figure 3 Herfindahl index9 for oil imports in China, Japan, and Korea between
1995 and 2011. Author’s calculation.
Source: United Nations Comtrade Database.
Figure 4 Origins of oil imports in China and Japan, 2011.
Source: EIA.
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However, the success narrative of supplier diversification becomes
doubtful when one considers the refinery configurations into account. First,
the supplier diversification was only numerical, and China’s ability to with-
stand unanticipated supply shocks was much lower than conventionally
believed. It was only numerical in a sense that China’s diverse portfolio of
oil suppliers was an accidental outcome generated by a combination of
China’s limited sour crude processing capacity and a particular market
structure where there is no one dominant sweet crude exporter. Unin-
tended supplier diversification driven by refinery limitations hardly com-
plemented China’s oil security. Instead, China was vulnerable to supply
shocks, as China was running on a very tight sour crude processing capac-
ity. For instance, if a major supply disruption occurs in sweet crude pro-
ducers, there were simply little alternative oil suppliers who would make
up the missing barrels with crudes that Chinese refineries were able to
handle.
Second, China’s energy security looks brighter with the added refinery
capacity, despite the growing oil imports and, more interestingly, supplier
‘concentration’. China is expected to continue making the largest refinery
investment in the world (IEA 2011), with a particular emphasis on instal-
ling more desulfurization units (IEA 2011). This is a transitory period for
China’s refineries and its quest for oil security in general. With expected
stabilization of oil demand in China (Downs 2006) and completion of
major refinery projects, I expect China to be closer to a full-fledged refiner
by the late 2010s.
Corresponding to the refinery restructurings, China’s oil import portfolio
is likely to look rather different from today. Above all, contrary to the
2000s during which China’s reliance on the Middle East remained below
50%, it is expected to grow to up to 70% by 2020. This reflects both the
sheer dominance of Middle East crudes in the global market and the
planned expansion of desulfurization capacity. Ironically, with diversified
refinery configurations, China’s ability to resist oil shocks would be
enhanced despite the decreased supplier diversification.
4.3. International consequences: growing ties with sour producers
In addition to domestic dimensions, the refinery analysis provides more
subtle and complete insight into China’s political ties with crude producers.
And yet, by neglecting refinery expansion as a precondition for trade, the
current literature only superficially dealt with how China’s political ties
with sour crude producers were built and expanded. While sour crude pro-
ducers are located in Central Asia and Latin America also, this analysis
focuses on the Middle East since it outweighs other regions in the trading
volume and also due to its prime place in the global oil trade and US grand
strategy.
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4.3.1. Refinery development and cooperation
A large portion of refinery development initiatives took a form of joint
ventures with IOCs and other NOCs. Installation of desulfurization units is
costly, risky, and technologically challenging from the business point of
view, and China’s rapidly increasing demand for the units meant that these
initiatives could not be taken up by Chinese companies only. To share the
installation costs, spread business risks, and gain access to necessary tech-
nology, Chinese NOCs have been forthcoming to joint venture deals which
other IOCs and NOCs also saw as an opportunity to get a foothold in the
Chinese downstream market.
Among these deals, refinery cooperation with NOCs from sour crude pro-
ducers is particularly noteworthy. Such refineries are usually designed to
process the producer’s export grade, and hence accompanied by a long-term
supply contract. The shared ownership, therefore, has ‘locking-in’ effects on
the oil trade between China and the exporters such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Venezuela, or Russia. Examples of joint ventures with other NOCs include
the aforementioned joint investment in refineries located in Fujian and
Qingdao, or the recent memorandum of understanding (MOU) between
Saudi Aramco and PetroChina in 2011 for building a refinery in Yunnan, or
a joint venture for Guangdong refinery with Venezuela (Reuters 2014).
With the further plans to install sour processing units in the coming
years, pundits anticipate that the Chinese reliance on the Middle East
would go up as high as to 70% (Olimat 2010). As one scholar noted, ‘the
age of Chinese passivity in the Middle East is over’ (Liangxiang 2005).
Overall, refinery development and cooperation produce the effects of
increasing returns on the trade with sour crude producers.
4.3.2. Political ties
Oil trade is unlike other trade since the high volume in oil trade often facil-
itates and deepens political linkages between trade partners. In fact, oil
trade and political interaction mutually reinforce each other. Chinese
heavy dependence on oil imports makes it no exception. Significantly, sour
producers are mainly located in the Middle East and Central Asia, and the
growing ties with these producers carry far more political implications than
China’s previous links with sweet crude producers, most of which were
found in Africa.
It is worth noting that China’s interest to expand trade with sour crude
producers is reciprocated by producers’ interests in the Chinese market.
This exporters’ shift to China stems from the concomitant rise of US
domestic and Canadian crude production that tend to crowd out their tra-
ditional oil imports from the Middle East and to a lesser extent, Africa.
Sour and heavy oils from the Persian Gulf, for instance, are expected to be
substituted by safer and cheaper Canadian unconventional oils. Under the
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changes in market conditions surrounding US oil trade, to the eyes of these
Gulf producers, China is a natural and attractive alternative export destina-
tion for its still expanding import market powered by the ongoing addition
of desulfurization capacity.
Overall, in the context of shared desires for deeper trade interaction
between China and oil producers, China’s oil trade ties are frequently spec-
ulated to have meaningful spillover on political dimensions. Mutual visits
between Hu Jintao and King Abadallah in 2006 were largely interpreted as
a shared commitment to deepen trade and political interaction, which was
followed by the Chinese investment of political capital and resources, a
pattern seen in China’s relations with other oil producers. Similarly, the
2006 summit between Hu and Chavez signified mutual interests in enhanc-
ing energy cooperation and developing strategic partnership (People’s
Daily 2006).
Is growing trade and political interaction a source of alarmism for the
US foreign policy? Some are concerned for two reasons. First, China’s
expanding ties have been alleged to challenge traditional US dominance
in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East, while intensifying competi-
tion in new regions such as in Central Asia (Leverett and Bader 2005;
Yetiv and Lu 2007). Second, foreign acquisition activities involve a trans-
fer of financial capital and sometimes an exchange of political favors that
embolden repressive oil-producing authoritarian regimes such as Sudan or
countries that challenges US hegemony including Venezuela and Iran
(Glaser 2013).
Others disagree. They report that China is still hesitant to link its energy
quest with the broader political context because avoiding tension with the
USA serves Chinese interests better than attempting to confront US grand
strategy in the regions like Latin America, the Middle East, or Africa
where China has no military projection capability or little political leverage
vis-a-vis the USA (Yi-Chong 2006, 2008; Downs 2007).
Again, this paper does not draw conclusive assessment whether it is
appropriate or premature to infer meaningful strategic significance out of
growing economic ties between China and sour crude producers in the
Middle East and Latin America. Examining the plausibility of each argu-
ment is beyond the scope of this study.
And yet two lessons should be drawn. Above all, the inseparable and
consequential roles that refineries play in these oil trade relationships must
be properly accounted for in any relevant analysis. Moreover, even if the
oil trade has insignificant political spillovers today, scholars, analysts, and
policy-makers alike still should continue keeping track of refinery plans
and deals as a part of efforts to make informed judgment about how the
relationship between oil and politics evolve in the coming years. The
changing oil trade movement continues to warrant serious attention from
political analysts to the extent that trade volume is correlated to depth of
political ties.
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5. Conclusion
Refineries are inseparable and fundamental to oil trade and security, and
often draw interstate cooperation that entails political ties. However, the
roles and consequences of refineries are scantly discussed in both political
science and energy literature, and this paper showed that such neglect is
unwarranted. Refineries perform a critical function of transforming crudes
into petroleum products. Either insufficient or under-diversified refining
capacity exposes states to greater risks and costs, particularly in times of
energy crisis. Fundamentals of Chinese oil security over the last decades
were decisively made brittle by insufficient desulfurization capacity, com-
pelling China to run on the tight sour crude processing capacity.
With sustained upgrades and expansion, however, Chinese refineries are
growingly presenting opportunities for China’s foreign relations, and act
less as restraints on energy security. The paper outlined how with greater
sour crude processing capacity, China’s trade ties with the Middle East or
other sour crude producers are rapidly deepening. Investing and cooperat-
ing with foreign refineries is another and yet less publicized venue through
which China is expanding its international presence in the regions such as
Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. In light of virtual silence on
these issues, the effects on refinery expansion and export on China’s for-
eign relations certainly deserve further and more in-depth attention in and
outside of academia.
Study of refineries has broader theoretical implications. First, the con-
ventional focus on stable and secure access to crudes is too narrow and
potentially misleading, and the concept of oil security must encompass an
importer’s refinery configuration and capacity. Refineries involve large
sums of financial capital and high levels of technical expertise, and refining
other crude grades are accordingly either commercially unattractive or
technically infeasible. It follows that states with insufficiently diversified
refining configurations run a greater risk of struggling to find their desired
crude grades and paying the premium by having to import petroleum prod-
ucts. Oil security should be conceptualized as a combination of secure
access to crudes and adequate refinery structure.
Second, the success of supplier diversification is contingent upon corre-
sponding refinery configurations. This elaborates Churchill’s long-time
advice ‘diversity and diversity alone’ that guided states’ crudes import poli-
cies for nearly a century. Importer’s diverse sources of crudes certainly
contribute but do not determine the robustness of a state’s oil security.
Indeed, states can be diversified in suppliers and yet still insecure due to
under-diversified or insufficient refinery capacities, as was the case in the
early 2000s of China. Reversely, the level of oil security can be relatively
high under a less diversified set of suppliers, a status that I anticipate China
to enjoy in the late 2010s.
I. Kim: Refining the Prize 381
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [S
ing
ap
or
e M
an
ag
em
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
5:1
2 0
5 J
an
ua
ry
 20
18
 
Third, this converses with another larger weakness in political science 
widespread neglect about the impact of technology on political interac-
tions. The oil industry is particularly technology-intensive (Ross 2012:
4449) and yet any discussion about its effects on interstate relations is
conspicuously absent. This paper outlined how expensive and hard-to-
attain refinery technology forges trade relations and refinery cooperation
that may have taken alternative paths under different sets of technological
specifications. Another similar example is Exploration and Production
(E&P) technology. Chinese NOCs have an abundance in relevant experi-
ence and technology to deal with onshore oils which recently allowed
China to be welcomed in Iraqi oil E&P projects (Arango and Krauss
2014). In contrast, Chinese NOCs do not have comparable offshore E&P
technology, forming barriers to political and business opportunities with
states that produce offshore oils. Again, these examples point to a larger
point made here. Certain technology is both of limited accessibility and
hence political consequence, which accordingly provides unique opportu-
nity or constraint for interstate strategic interactions. In such cases, under-
standing the basics of technology can offer distinctive insights in the
changing depth of political ties between states, as exemplified with the
roles and consequences of Chinese refineries in this paper.
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Notes
1. There is no agreed API threshold to distinguish heavy and light crude. For
instance, World Oil and Gas Review (ENI) classify API degree higher than 35
as light, between 26 and 35 as medium, and lower than 25 as heavy. Canadian
government has two classifications, light for API degree 25.7 or higher and
heavy for 25.7 or lower.
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2. There are many cracking techniques, but broadly divided into ‘thermal’ and
‘catalytic’. Thermal cracking employ steam, visbreaking, or coking, while cata-
lytic cracking includes techniques such as fluid or hydrocracking.
3. Sulfur is not entirely removed, but there is usually legal requirement on sulfur
content because of the detrimental environmental effects. Also, sulfur damages
the pipes within refinery facilities. See Horsnell (1997: 53). It notes that the refin-
eries’ inability to process sour crudes cannot be solved simply by adding desul-
phurization units, but it must be accompanied by an upgrading of the quality of
steel in pipes and distillation towers to cope with corrosion.
4. For instance, the recent 45,000 bpd expansion of the Consumers Co-op refinery
in Regina, SK cost $2.7 billion. See Canadian Fuels Association (2013: 3).
5. Even where Chinese preference for sweet oil is mentioned (for instance, see
Downs 2006; Zha 2006), it is little more than passing notes and often with confu-
sion between API and sulfur content. Chinese crudes are heavy and sweet, but
some works wrongly note that Chinese refineries are configured for light crudes.
6. This is manifested in the high amount of cracking capacity or high cracking/
CDU ratio, although Chinese refineries lack coking capacity (See Smith 2012).
The Chinese investment in upgrading and expanding of cracking units is
continuing.
7. Another factor was its lack of regulation on sulfur content in petroleum prod-
ucts. However, this is secondary concern as sulfur still needs to be removed
from sour crudes for its corrosive property.
8. NOCs became more autonomous with its business expansion and integration
into global oil market, both of which made it much more difficult for the govern-
ment agencies to trace and monitor its activities.
9. Herfindal index measures a degree of concentration, originally used as an indica-
tor of competition in the market. The higher the index, the more power small
number of agents has. In this context, the higher the index is, the less diversified
oil suppliers are. Mathematically, it is defined as “a sum of the squares of the
share of the 50 largest agents”.
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